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Non-Technical Summary 
Although for reaching an agreement in climate negotiations the overall abatement target and 
hence the total implementation costs of a climate treaty have always played an important role, 
there is also evidence that climate talks are, to a huge amount, centered around the question of 
how to share a given abatement burden. Already the Climate Change Convention from 1992 
states the basic principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, and numerous other 
negotiation documents are penetrated by the language of equity. 
In this paper we analyze the equity preferences of negotiators in climate policy and try to shed 
some light on the question about how far equity considerations are important for climate 
negotiations. We operationalize the notion of equity introducing the concept of inequity 
aversion developed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). According to their approach, people are 
endowed with aversion against advantageous and disadvantageous inequity to a different 
degree. We measure the degree of inequity aversion of people who have been involved in 
international climate negotiations with the help of two simple non-strategic games. 116 people 
from all regions of the world participated in the experiment, which was run via the Internet. 
We find that policy-makers exhibit a much stronger preference for equity than students in a 
comparable study. Possible explanations for this include an education effect, different 
relevancy of the experimental payoff, and different experience with economic experiments. 
Considering the geographic variety of respondents’ countries of origin in our sample, we 
cannot confirm significant differences in inequity aversion. Our results are therefore in line 
with previous findings of behavior in this kind of games which also cannot confirm 
differences between different regions of the world due to cultural differences. These findings 
fit the idea that inequity aversion is an anthropological fundamental, not much influenced by 
socio-economic or cultural circumstances. 
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Abstract 
This paper investigates in how far equity preferences may matter for climate negotiations. For this purposes we 
conducted a simple experiment with people who have been involved in international climate policy. The 
experiment, which was run via the Internet, consisted of two simple non-strategic games suited to measure the 
parameters of inequity aversion in a Fehr and Schmidt (1999) utility function. We find that our participants show 
aversion against advantageous as well as disadvantageous inequity to a considerable amount. Moreover, the 
degree of inequity aversion is higher compared to that of students in the similar study of Dannenberg et al. 
(2007). Regarding the geographical variety in our sample, we cannot confirm significant differences in the 
degree of inequity aversion between different regions in the world, which is in line with previous findings from 
the experimental literature. This finding lends support to the hypothesis that equity preferences are "hard-wired" 
and not much influenced by socio-economic or cultural circumstances.  
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1 Introduction 
Although for reaching an agreement in climate negotiations the overall abatement target and 
hence the total implementation costs of a climate treaty have always played an important role, 
there is also evidence that climate talks are, to a huge amount, centered around the question of 
how to share a given abatement burden. Already the Climate Change Convention from 1992 
states the basic principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, and numerous other 
negotiation documents are penetrated by the language of equity. Different parties in the 
climate negotiations refer to different burden sharing principles: Developing countries often 
point to the fact of much higher per capita carbon dioxide emissions of industrialized 
countries. They often refer to the egalitarian principle which states that every citizen has the 
same right to pollute. Consequently, they demand an equalization of per capita emissions at 
least in the long run. Also, the current proposal of German Chancellor Merkel for a follow-up 
treaty of the Kyoto Protocol adopts this long-term goal.1 Other equity rules refer either to 
responsibility or ability to cope with the problem of climate change. The polluter-pays rule, 
for example, claims that abatement costs should be distributed proportionately to a country’s 
share in global emissions. The ability-to-pay rule demands that abatement costs should be 
shared according to a country’s economic capability measured by its GDP. A fourth principle, 
favored in the past mainly by the United States is the sovereignty rule. It incorporates the idea 
of an equal percentage emission reduction for all countries, implying also substantial 
abatement efforts for important, growing developing countries like China or India. All these 
principles stem from different views on equity and fairness. 
The impression that equity considerations play a major role in climate negotiations is 
supported by a recent survey (Lange et al. 2007b) asking participants of the climate 
negotiation process about their views on equity. Nearly 80 percent of all respondents state that 
equity is of very high or high importance in the climate talks. Moreover, this survey identifies 
important fairness principles that motivate negotiation positions of major negotiation blocks. 
                                                 
1 In a speech given in September 2007 in Tokio, Chancellor Merkel suggested to base a future climate treaty on 
per-capita carbon dioxide emissions. Moreover, she proposed that industrialized countries should reduce their 
per-capita emissions while at the same time allowing developing countries like China or India to increase theirs 
until per-capita emissions are equalized. This resembles the well-known contraction and convergence approach 
(Meyer 2000). 
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The EU, for example, is predominantly seen to be driven by the polluter-pays principle while 
many respondents associate the United States with the sovereignty rule.2
Essentially, this evidence can be interpreted in two different ways. First, it could mean that 
equity principles enter climate negotiations because they reflect deep and serious convictions 
of the parties involved. Second, one might conjecture that equity arguments are used 
strategically in order to hide goals which can mainly be traced back to pure material self 
interest. Lange et al. (2007a), for example, argue that negotiation parties may invoke fairness 
principles to influence the bargaining outcome in their interest. 
Contrary to the latter argument which is rather speculative, there is much evidence that human 
behavior is indeed driven by equity considerations to a certain extent. Within experimental 
economics, huge evidence has been collected contradicting the economic model of man based 
on the two pillars of rationality and pure selfishness. People cooperate in social dilemmas 
such as public good games (Ledyard 1995), they reject high amounts of money in the 
ultimatum game (Güth et al. 1982, Camerer 2003) and last but not least they make positive 
contributions in the dictator game (Kahneman et al. 1986, Forsythe et al. 1994). The 
contradiction between the standard economic model of selfish behavior and empirical 
observations has been a challenge for both theorists and experimentalists. In the last ten years 
a number of theories that try to close this gap in explanatory power have been developed. 
Most of these theories are based on the assumption that people have some kind of other-
regarding, or social, preferences. These approaches seek to overcome the discrepancies 
between standard game-theoretical prediction and experimental observation by altering the 
underlying utility function of the subjects, but stick to the assumption that subjects behave 
rationally. The models by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) are 
prominent examples for this approach. They assume that people are willing to sacrifice money 
in order to avoid unequal payoff distributions. As a matter of fact, both models are able to 
explain an impressing amount of experimentally observed behavior. 
Moreover, these theoretical approaches bear the potential to greatly facilitate the explanation 
of voluntary cooperation in dilemma situations. Within the framework of a two-stage coalition 
                                                 
2 Not only the political but also the academic debate cares about equity issues. Several papers explore the 
equitable burden sharing of a given reduction target, e.g. Barrett (1992), Bosello and Roson (2000), Buonanno et 
al. (2000), LeCocq et al. (2000), Ridgley (1996), Rose (1992), Rose and Stevens (1993) and Rose et al. (1998). 
Tol (1999) combines cost-effectiveness and intertemporal equity in his analysis. A second branch of the 
literature searches for those reduction measures that maximize human welfare, e.g. Maddison (1995), Manne et 
al. (1995), Nordhaus (1991, 1992), Nordhaus and Yang (1996), Peck and Teisberg (1991, 1995) and Tol (1997, 
1999). As Kemfert and Tol (2002, p. 24) note, however, these attempts "are based on a narrow neo-classical 
interpretation of justice". 
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formation game, Lange and Vogt (2003) prove that coalitions which involve a rather large 
fraction of countries can be stabilized as a Nash equilibrium when other-regarding preferences 
are involved. This result stands in sharp contrast to the according results of coalition games 
which assume a standard preference structure. There, only small coalitions that achieve very 
little in terms of abatement and welfare can be stabilized (Barrett 1994, Carraro and 
Siniscalco 1993). According to Lange and Vogt, the critical condition to ensure a large 
coalition of cooperative countries is the presence of sufficiently many countries with high 
enough inequity aversion. Already Fehr and Schmidt (1999) prove that partial cooperation can 
be a Nash equilibrium in a public good game if at least some subjects dispose of sufficiently 
strong inequity aversion. Since climate protection can essentially be characterized as a social 
dilemma, the cooperation enhancing effect of equity preferences might also be of practical 
relevance for real world climate policy. However, whether the critical conditions for 
cooperative behavior are fulfilled is a question which can be answered only empirically. 
Two recent studies explicitly address the question whether the Fehr and Schmidt model (in 
the following F&S) has explanatory power in public good games. Blanco et al. (2006) find 
that the F&S model has only predictive power at the aggregate level. Building on this study 
and its experimental design, Dannenberg et al. (2007) find in contrast that F&S also has 
predictive power at the individual level. Particularly, they find that subjects with a stronger 
aversion against advantageous inequity significantly more often cooperate in a public good 
game.3
This result might be of importance for real world cooperation problems. If the chances to 
come to an agreement depend on the degree of inequity aversion, this should be taken into 
account. Particularly, it might be more promising to enter into negotiations with countries that 
are similar with respect to their degree of equity orientation.4 Within this context, the question 
arises whether the findings from the laboratory apply to the real world. A priori it is not clear 
whether real world negotiators show a degree of inequity aversion like the one discovered in 
experiments involving students. For example, one could easily imagine that, due to selection 
or also self-selection mechanisms, real world agents are tougher and less fairness motivated 
than students. Additionally, the issue of how individual equity preferences relate to the 
corresponding collective preferences of governments turns up. 
                                                 
3 In Dannenberg et al. (2007), subjects are informed before the public good game about the co-player’s type, i.e. 
his or her inequity aversion. This may have caused the difference in the results compared to Blanco et al. (2006). 
See Dannenberg et al. (2007) for details. 
4 This argument will be backed up theoretically in section 2. 
 5
The innovative contribution of the present paper consists in suggesting a simple way to 
include equity preferences into the global climate policy context. Furthermore, we make a 
first attempt at elicitation and quantification of such equity concerns. Therefore, we carried 
out simple experiments with people who have been involved in international climate policy. 
116 people from all regions of the world participated in an Internet experiment that consisted 
basically of two simple non-strategic games (named games A and B) introduced by Blanco et 
al. (2006) suited to measure the parameters of inequity aversion in an F&S utility function. 
Game A is designed to measure the subjects’ aversion against disadvantageous inequity. The 
game resembles the responder’s basic decision situation in the ultimatum game but abstracts 
from strategic interaction, such that we can rule out strategic considerations such as intentions 
or reciprocity. Game B resembles the decision problem in the dictator game and is suited to 
measure the subjects’ aversion against advantageous inequity.  
We find that our participants show aversion against both types of inequity to a considerable 
amount. Moreover, the degree of inequity aversion is significantly higher compared to that of 
students in Dannenberg et al. (2007). Regarding the geographical variety in our data, we find 
that the degrees of inequity aversion between different regions of the world are rather similar. 
When comparing G8 versus Non-G8 countries and EU versus Non-EU countries we do not 
find any significant difference in the measured aversion parameters. Only for G77 compared 
to Non-G77 countries, we find a difference in both types of inequity aversion showing the 
G77-respondents more inequity avers, but this effect is only weakly significant. 
This paper proceeds as follows: In section 2, the theoretical background underlying our study, 
i.e. the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and its relevance for prognosis regarding individual 
behavior in a voluntary contribution game is briefly explained. Section 3 describes the 
experimental design and how the F&S parameters reflecting inequity aversion are measured, 
followed by a short description of our subject pool in section 4. In section 5, the results are 
presented. Section 6 gives a discussion of our findings. The last section, as always, concludes. 
2 Theoretical background: The model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
2.1 Preferences 
According to Fehr and Schmidt (1999) individuals are not exclusively motivated by the 
absolute payoff they can earn but also value allocations due to their distributional 
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consequences. Particularly, assuming that individuals suffer from inequity, F&S introduce the 
following utility function for subject i : 
( ) { } {∑∑
≠≠
0−1−
1−0−1−
1−=
n
ij
jii
n
ij
ijiijii ππn
βππ
n
απππU ,max,max, }  (1) 
where iπ  and  denote the absolute payoffs to subjects i  and jπ j , respectively,  denotes the 
total number of players involved in some decision problem, 
n
0≥iα  measures the impact of ’s 
disutility from disadvantageous inequity while 
i
0≥iβ  measures the corresponding impact of 
advantageous inequity. In the two player case which is particularly relevant for our 
experimental setting, (1) reduces to  
( ) { } { }0−−0−−= ,max,max, jiiijiijii ππβππαπππU .    (2) 
F&S assume , i.e. players are not willing to “burn” their money to eliminate 
advantageous inequality. In addition, they assume that players put a greater weight on 
disadvantageous inequality, i.e. . In our experiment, we will obtain the weights  and 
 from modified ultimatum and dictator games (see section 3). 
1<iβ
ii βα ≥ iα
iβ
2.2 The voluntary contribution game 
The voluntary contribution game5 resembles the basic strategic incentives of a situation where 
subjects have the possibility to contribute to the production of a global environmental good, 
such as “climate protection”. Assuming standard preferences in a voluntary contribution 
game, not to contribute to the production of the public good is the Nash equilibrium in 
dominant strategies although from a social point of view mutual cooperation would be 
preferable. In other words, if  denotes a player’s individual contribution to the public good 
and a, with 
ig
1<<1 an , denote the marginal per capita return (MPCR) of  then  is the 
best choice for each player i independently from the other players’ contributions.  
ig 0=ig
                                                 
5 For a detailed description of this game as a special form of a public good game, see e.g. Dannenberg et al. 
(2007). Sturm and Weimann (2006) discuss the relevance of this game for experiments in environmental 
economics. 
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F&S have shown that this result is fundamentally altered if players are endowed with inequity 
aversion according to (1). Let  denote the number of players. F&S prove the following 
results: 
2≥n
1. If , then it is a dominant strategy for player  to choose  1<+ iβa i .0=ig
2. Let k, nk ≤≤0 , denote the number of players with . Then, if 1<+ iβa
( ) 2≥1− ank , there exists a unique equilibrium with { }.,...,10 nigi ∈∀=  
3. If for all players  with { nj ,...,1∈ } 1>+ jβa  the condition 
( ) ( ) ( )jjj βαβank +1−+<1−        (3) 
holds, then equilibria with positive contributions to the public good exist. All k players 
with  choose  while all other players contribute . 1<+ iβa 0=ig [ ]ygg j ,0∈=
The intuition behind these results is not too difficult. Firstly, if a player with  invests 
one monetary unit in the public good, his monetary return is  while he gains a maximum 
non-monetary utility of . Now, if the sum of both returns is less than one, it is obviously the 
best strategy not to invest into the public good, irrespectively of what other players do. 
Secondly, if there are sufficiently many players with 
1<+ iβa
a
iβ
1<+ jβa , then player j  will not be 
willing to contribute even if he shows stronger inequity aversion, i.e. for him  holds. 
The reason for that is that relatively few “fair” players are unable to sufficiently reduce 
disadvantageous inequity. Thirdly, if there are sufficiently many players with , they 
can sustain cooperation amongst themselves, “even if the other players do not contribute. 
However, this requires that the contributors are not too upset about the disadvantageous 
inequality toward the free riders.” (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, p. 840).  
1>+ jβa
1>+ jβa
In the following, we use (3) to discuss the meaning of  and  for the prospects of 
cooperation explicitly. Let us define 
jα jβ
( )( ) ( )jjjcrit βαβank +1−+1−=: , the critical number of 
non-cooperative countries. First, it is to observe that ( )( ) ( )2+−1+1−=∂∂ jjjjcrit βαaαnβk  
which is positive since the MPCR is always less than 1. Hence, an increasing aversion 
towards advantageous inequity makes cooperation in the voluntary contribution game more 
likely since (3) is more easily met. Second, considering  we find jα
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( )( ) ( )2+−−11−=∂∂ jjjjcrit βαβanαk . For subjects with 1>+ jβa  this derivative obviously 
becomes negative implying that an increasing degree of aversion against disadvantageous 
inequity makes it more difficult to sustain cooperation amongst “fair” subjects.6  
To summarize, while a higher degree of advantageous inequity always improves the prospects 
for a cooperative solution this is not the case for disadvantageous inequity. However, for a 
given value of , high values of  are only necessary but not sufficient to ensure stable 
cooperative outcomes. To attain such a socially preferable outcome, i.e. to exceed the critical 
value  of non-cooperative countries, the benefit-to-cost ratio of the contribution to the 
public good has to be sufficiently high. 
jα jβ
critk
3 Experimental design 
We used two different games (games A and B) in our experimental design. The purpose of 
games A and B was to measure each subject’s preferences according to the F&S model. Game 
A is designed to measure the subjects’ aversion against disadvantageous inequity. The game 
resembles the responder’s basic decision situation in the ultimatum game but abstracts from 
strategic interaction, such that we can rule out individual behavior caused by strategic 
considerations such as intentions or reciprocity.7 In this game, each subject has to decide in 
22 cases (numbered from #1 to #22) in the role of Person 1 between two pairs of payoffs 
(pair I and pair II) each with an amount of money for himself or herself and another subject in 
the role of Person 2. Payoffs (see the left part of Table 1) are chosen in a way that – except for 
#1 – subjects always have to choose between “pair I”, a disadvantageously unequal division 
of $200.00, and “pair II”, an equal distribution with $40.00 for both players. All cases were 
arranged in a descending order by the amount of money subjects could earn with pair I. In this 
game, a purely selfish subject should choose pair I from #1 to #20 and pair II for #21 and 
#22.8 A subject strongly disliking disadvantageous inequity, in contrast, would choose pair I 
in #1 and pair II from #2 to #22. Subjects with other-regarding preferences according to F&S 
                                                 
6 The parameter  has additional importance for a public good game with a possibility to punish other subjects 
at own costs. In such a game, subjects with a sufficiently high  may enforce cooperation of selfishly motivated 
subjects. The reason for this is that those “enforcers” are able to exercise a credible threat to punish free riders in 
order to reduce disadvantageous inequity. See Fehr and Schmidt (1999) as well as Dannenberg et al. (2007).  
iα
iα
7 The difference to the payoffs of the original ultimatum game is the fact that the conflict point payoffs (in $) are 
changed to (40, 40) instead of the original (0, 0). 
8 In the following, we assume rational behavior of all subjects. 
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between these two extremes would be expected to switch from choosing pair I to pair II after 
#2 but prior to #21.  
We describe individual behavior in game A as consistent if (1.) a subject has a unique 
switching point from pair I to pair II and (2.) this switching point is between #2 and #21. 
Regarding the first condition, a subject with aversion against disadvantageous inequity 
consistent with the F&S model, who switches for a specific case from pair I to pair II should 
choose for all subsequent cases pair II. As the payoffs for player 1 in pair I are arranged in 
descending order, a switch back to pair I in any of the subsequent decisions is not consistent. 
This would lead to a lower own payment and to higher disadvantageous inequity than in the 
case that was rejected before. In relation to the second condition, it is useful to consider the 
decision cases outside of the “consistent area” between #2 and #21. A subject who chooses 
pair II in #1 already is not regarded as consistent because he or she could attain an equal 
allocation with higher own payoff by choosing pair I. A subject who chooses pair II in #22 
likes disadvantageous inequity, i.e. , and is therefore not consistent with the F&S 
model. With the subject’s switching point we can determine the upper and lower bounds of 
the individual . We approximate the individual value for  by choosing the mean of the 
corresponding interval (see Table 1).
0<iα
iα iα
9
Game B – which resembles the decision problem in the dictator game – is designed to 
measure the subjects’ aversion against advantageous inequity.10 Again, each subject had to 
decide between two pairs of payoffs (pair I and pair II) each with an amount of money for 
himself or herself in the role of Person 1 and another subject in the role of Person 2 in 22 
cases (from #1 to #22; see the right part of Table 1). Payoffs are chosen in a way that subjects 
had to choose between “pair I”, an extremely unequal but advantageous distribution of 
$200.00, and “pair II”, an equal distribution of different amounts from $0.00 to $210.00 for 
each player. All cases were arranged in an ascending order by the amount of money subjects 
could earn in pair II. In this game, a purely selfish subject would choose pair I from #1 
through #20 and pair II for #22. In the case of #21, this subject would be indifferent between 
pair I and pair II. A subject strongly disliking advantageous inequity would always choose 
                                                 
9 There are two exceptions to this rule. Firstly, we cannot determine an upper bound for  of a subject who 
switches from pair I to pair II in #2. Therefore, we assign to those subjects the value of the lower bound, 
. Secondly, we assign the value 
iα
182= .iα 0=iα  to a subject who switches from pair I to pair II in #21, 
although the corresponding interval for this case is 040≤≤080− .. iα . 
10 Strictly speaking, game B is equivalent to a reduced form of the dictator game only for decision #11. However, 
similar to the dictator game, game B creates a trade-off between own monetary payoff which creates 
advantageous inequity and a lower but equally distributed payoff. 
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pair II. Subjects with equity preferences according to F&S between these both extremes 
would be expected to switch from choosing pair I to pair II after #1 but before #21.  
We label individual behavior in game B as consistent if (1.) a subject has a unique switching 
point from pair I to pair II and (2.) this switching point is between #2 and #22., i.e. if the 
individual weight of aversion against advantageous inequity meets 1<≤0 iβ . Relating to the 
first condition, a subject with aversion against advantageous inequity consistent with the F&S 
model switching from pair I to pair II at one point, should also choose pair II in all cases after 
the switching point. As the payoffs for Person 1 in pair II are arranged in an ascending order, 
a switch back to pair I in any of the subsequent cases is not consistent. This would lead to the 
same advantageous inequity that was rejected before but now with higher opportunity costs in 
terms of equal payoffs for both players. For the second condition, we consider again the 
decision cases outside of the “consistent area” between #2 and #22. A subject choosing pair II 
already in #1 has , i.e. is willing to “burn” money in order to produce equal payoffs. A 
subject who does not switch at all displays affection for advantageous inequity, i.e. 
1≥iβ
0<iβ . 
Both behavioral patterns are not consistent with F&S. Similar to game A, we can determine 
the upper and lower bounds for the individual’s  by means of a subject’s switching point. 
We approximate the individual value of  by choosing the mean of the corresponding 
interval (see Table 1).
iβ
iβ
11  
A basic assumption underlying our design of games A and B is that individuals are only 
driven by preferences of the F&S-type. This means in particular that individuals do not hold 
any specific preferences with regard to “efficiency”. An example will help to illustrate this 
point. In our game B, the sum of both payoffs in pair II rises from $0 in #1 to $420 in #22. An 
individual caring for efficiency only will switch from pair I to pair II after #10 or after #11. 
Given an individual cares for equity and efficiency, we underestimate his or her aversion 
against advantageous inequity for 53> .iβ  and overestimate it for 53< .iβ . 
                                                 
11 As before, there is an exception to this rule. We assign the value  to a subject who switches from pair I 
to pair II in #22, although the corresponding interval in this case is 
0=iβ
0≤≤050− iβ. . 
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Table 1: Payoffs in game A and game B 
   game A   game B   
   pair I pair II   pair I      pair II   
   payoffs (in $) for person  payoffs (in $) for person  
   #   1 2 1 2 iα   1 2  1  2  iβ  
1  100.00 100.00 40.00 40.00  -  200.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  1.00 
2  88.80 111.20 40.00 40.00  2.18  200.00 0.00 10.00 10.00  0.98 
3  88.40 111.60 40.00 40.00  2.13  200.00 0.00 20.00 20.00  0.93 
4  87.80 112.20 40.00 40.00  2.02  200.00 0.00 30.00 30.00  0.88 
5  87.20 112.80 40.00 40.00  1.90  200.00 0.00 40.00 40.00  0.83 
6  86.40 113.60 40.00 40.00  1.77  200.00 0.00 50.00 50.00  0.78 
7  85.80 114.20 40.00 40.00  1.66  200.00 0.00 60.00 60.00  0.73 
8  84.80 115.20 40.00 40.00  1.54  200.00 0.00 70.00 70.00  0.68 
9  83.80 116.20 40.00 40.00  1.41  200.00 0.00 80.00 80.00  0.63 
10  82.80 117.20 40.00 40.00  1.30  200.00 0.00 90.00 90.00  0.58 
11  81.40 118.60 40.00 40.00  1.18  200.00 0.00 100.00 100.00  0.53 
12  78.40 121.60 40.00 40.00  1.00  200.00 0.00 110.00 110.00  0.48 
13  77.20 122.80 40.00 40.00  0.85  200.00 0.00 120.00 120.00  0.43 
14  76.20 123.80 40.00 40.00  0.79  200.00 0.00 130.00 130.00  0.38 
15  73.60 126.40 40.00 40.00  0.70  200.00 0.00 140.00 140.00  0.33 
16  70.60 129.40 40.00 40.00  0.58  200.00 0.00 150.00 150.00  0.28 
17  66.60 133.40 40.00 40.00  0.46  200.00 0.00 160.00 160.00  0.23 
18  57.00 143.00 40.00 40.00  0.30  200.00 0.00 170.00 170.00  0.18 
19  54.40 145.60 40.00 40.00  0.18  200.00 0.00 180.00 180.00  0.13 
20  44.40 155.60 40.00 40.00  0.10  200.00 0.00 190.00 190.00  0.08 
21  28.60 171.40 40.00 40.00  0.00  200.00 0.00 200.00 200.00  0.03 
sw
itc
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ng
 p
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nt
 fr
om
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r I
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r I
I 
22  2.00 198.00 40.00 40.00 -0.14  200.00 0.00 210.00 210.00  0.00 
 
The experiment was run via the Internet. Participants obtained an individual login which 
ensured that every individual could take part only once. After subjects logged in, they 
received an introductory page where the decision problems in games A and B were explained 
(see Appendix for a full description). Participants were explicitly told that they could earn real 
money by taking part in this experiment. Next, it was explained in detail how the payoffs 
from the experiment are determined: From all participants – who have all made their 
decisions as Person 1 in both games – we randomly selected 10 subjects and matched them 
into pairs. For each pair we randomly selected one of the games (A or B) and one of the 
numbers (#1 to #22). Finally, we randomly selected for each pair who is Person 1 and who is 
Person 2. Person 1 then got the money he or she had assigned to himself or herself in the 
selected number of the selected game. Person 2 got the money Person 1 had assigned to 
Person 2 in that selected number of the selected game.  
Since the payment mechanism involved several random draws, people were advised that the 
best strategy would be to make every decision in a way as if it were to be realized. We 
pointed out that each decision – if realized – would not only determine the own payoff but 
also the payoff of another participant. We also emphasized the fact that although Person 1 
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determines the payoff of Person 2, there is no strategic interaction between participants. The 
instructions were completed by a very short summary of the main five features of the 
experiment. After that, participants were presented decision problem number A (i.e. game A) 
followed by a page containing decision problem number B (i.e. game B).  
The time necessary to go through all parts of the experiment was about 30 minutes. The 
expected mean payment per participant (given randomly distributed decisions and our 
estimate of 100 subjects, which was announced in the instructions) was $8.63. Two subjects 
out of the 116 participants (see section 4) did not go through all parts of the experiments, that 
is why they were not taken into account for payment. The realized mean payment per 
participant (10 out of 114 subjects based on real decisions) was $98.00, i.e. we finally paid 
out $980.00. All random selections necessary for the payment were drawn up in the presence 
of a notary.12 The money was transferred via Western Union and all participants were 
informed about their payoff via email. Participants and winners of the experiment remained 
anonymous, i.e. only the experimenters know their identity and their payoff. 
So far the study elicits individual preferences. However, real world climate negotiations are 
not necessarily governed by the individual preferences of those subjects involved in climate 
policy. Although preferences of negotiators for equity may play some role in the policy 
process, they are definitely not the sole determinant of the negotiation process. Governments 
form some kind of collective preference. This preference formation is a complex matter 
influenced by factors like voters’ preferences of the home country but also preferences of 
influential interest groups, for example. Despite the fact that it is nearly impossible to give a 
full explanation of this complicated formation process, we tried to figure out a first idea of 
what collective (governmental) preferences in climate policy negotiations might look like. 
Therefore, participants were pleased to imagine that the decisions in games A and B had to be 
made by a group of representatives of their country on a Conference of the Parties (COP) or a 
meeting of the Subsidiary Bodies (SB). Respondents then had to indicate how they believed 
the delegates would decide. Thereby, they were given the following opportunities for game A 
as well as for game B (see also the Appendix):13
 
                                                 
12 For the sake of credibility, the contact details of the notary were announced to the subjects (see Appendix). 
13 This approach might appear somewhat naive but we feel confident that these subjects, who have actually been 
involved in climate negotiations have the best understanding of how to assess the behavior of their government. 
Answering the question regarding the collective preferences, subjects were not able to change their individual 
decisions in the beforehand completed games A and B. 
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In your opinion, how would the group of representatives of your country decide? 
a) the same way as I did. 
b) compared to my decision, the decision of the group would lead to a distribution with more money for
Person 1. 
c) compared to my decision, the decision of the group would lead to a distribution with less money for 
Person 1. 
d) I do not know. 
 
For both games, answer (b), i.e. “more money for Person 1”, would indicate, that the subject 
expects a more selfishly oriented group of delegates. Accordingly, answer (c) indicates a 
collective inequity aversion which is stronger than in the case of the individual’s preference. 
The experiment closed by a final questionnaire which asked for several personal 
characteristics of the participants of our study (e.g. gender, nationality, field of highest degree, 
type of organization the subjects works for, participation in COP or SB). 
4 Subject pool 
The experiment was run over the course of eight weeks from June 1 until July 30, 2007. A 
total of 1480 people, who had been involved in climate negotiations before were contacted via 
mail and asked to participate in the experiment. Two weeks before the deadline, all subjects 
who had not answered by then received a reminder via email. 116 people took part so that the 
respond rate was around 8 %. The participants came from all over the world, 37.9 % were 
from Europe, 26.7 % from Africa, 18.1 % from Asia, 6.9 % from South America, 5.2 % from 
North America and 5.2 % from Australia and Oceania. The majority of them has its highest 
degree in natural sciences (43.1 %) followed by engineering (20.7 %), economics and 
business administration (7.8 %), law (5.2 %), and political sciences (4.3 %). The participants 
work mostly for national governmental organizations (74.1 %) and universities or research 
institutions (15.5 %). A few are employed in international governmental organizations 
(3.4 %), NGO’s (2.6 %), and private companies (0.9 %). Nearly three quarters (70.7 %) had 
been to a COP or SB meeting before (see Table 2 for further socio-economic characteristics).  
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Table 2: Socio-economic characteristics of participants 
Participants  All Consistent  
in A 
Consistent  
in B 
Consistent  
in A and B 
Frequency  Abs. in % Abs. in % Abs. in % Abs. in % 
Gender 
Female 
Male 
No answer 
 
24 
87 
5 
 
20.7 
75.0 
4.3 
 
14 
45 
3 
 
22.6 
72.6 
4.8 
 
17 
56 
3 
 
22.4 
73.7 
3.9 
 
11 
37 
2 
 
22.0 
74.0 
4.0 
Age 
20 – 29 
30 – 39 
40 – 49 
50 – 59 
60 – 69 
No answer 
 
13 
37 
33 
27 
2 
4 
 
11.2 
31.9 
28.4 
23.3 
1.7 
3.4 
 
5 
22 
17 
15 
0 
3 
 
8.1 
35.5 
27.4 
24.2 
0.0 
4.8 
 
5 
27 
22 
18 
1 
3 
 
6.6 
35.5 
28.9 
23.7 
1.3 
3.9 
 
3 
17 
15 
12 
0 
3 
 
6.0 
34.0 
30.0 
24.0 
0.0 
6.0 
Continent 
AFR 
AOZ 
ASI 
EUR 
NAM 
SAM 
 
31 
6 
21 
44 
6 
8 
 
26.7 
5.2 
18.1 
37.9 
5.2 
6.9 
 
9 
2 
12 
31 
3 
5 
 
14.5 
3.2 
19.4 
50.0 
4.8 
8.1 
 
11 
2 
14 
37 
5 
7 
 
14.5 
2.6 
18.4 
48.7 
6.6 
9.2 
 
5 
1 
9 
27 
3 
5 
 
10.0 
2.0 
18.0 
54.0 
6.0 
10.0 
EU/Non-EU 
EU 
Non-EU 
 
30 
86 
 
25.9 
74.1 
 
24 
38 
 
38.7 
61.3 
 
26 
50 
 
34.2 
65.8 
 
21 
29 
 
42.0 
58.0 
G8/Non-G8 
G8 
Non-G8 
 
21 
95 
 
18.1 
81.9 
 
16 
46 
 
25.8 
74.2 
 
19 
57 
 
25.0 
75.0 
 
15 
35 
 
30.0 
70.0 
G77/Non-G77 
G77 
Non-G77 
 
64 
52 
 
55.2 
44.8 
 
27 
36 
 
43.5 
56.5 
 
31 
45 
 
40.8 
59.2 
 
19 
31 
 
38.0 
62.0 
Field 
Natural sciences 
Political sciences 
Economics/Business administration 
Law 
Engineering 
Other 
 
50 
5 
9 
6 
24 
22 
 
43.1 
4.3 
7.8 
5.2 
20.7 
18.9 
 
25 
3 
6 
3 
12 
13 
 
40.3 
4.8 
9.7 
4.8 
19.4 
20.9 
 
33 
5 
8 
4 
11 
15 
 
43.4 
6.6 
10.5 
5.3 
14.5 
19.7 
 
19 
3 
6 
2 
8 
12 
 
38.0 
6.0 
12.0 
4.0 
16.0 
24.0 
Organisation 
International governmental institution 
National governmental institution 
University or research institution 
Private company 
NGO 
No answer 
 
4 
86 
18 
1 
3 
4 
 
3.4 
74.1 
15.5 
0.9 
2.6 
3.4 
 
3 
46 
10 
0 
1 
2 
 
4.8 
74.2 
16.1 
0.0 
1.6 
3.2 
 
3 
56 
14 
0 
1 
2 
 
3.9 
73.7 
18.4 
0.0 
1.3 
2.6 
 
3 
36 
9 
0 
0 
2 
 
6.0 
72.0 
18.0 
0.0 
0.0 
4.0 
COP/SBI or SBSTA participation 
Yes 
No 
No answer 
 
82 
29 
5 
 
70.7 
25.0 
4.3 
 
44 
15 
3 
 
71.0 
24.2 
4.8 
 
53 
20 
3 
 
69.7 
26.3 
3.9 
 
34 
13 
3 
 
68.0 
26.0 
6.0 
Σ  116 100.0 62 100.0 76 100.0 50 100.0  
Out of the 116 participants, 62 people (53.4 %) behaved consistently in game A and 76 people 
(65.5 %) behaved consistently in game B. In total, 50 people (43.1 %) behaved consistently in 
both games. Our results described in the next section will focus on these three (sub-)groups. 
The socio-economic characteristics for each group are also shown in Table 2. It is worth 
noting how greatly the composition sometimes differs between all participants and the three 
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groups. For example, while only one quarter (25.9 %) of all participants is from the EU, they 
make up almost half (42.0 %) of the group who behaved consistently in game A and in game 
B. Conversely, three quarters (74.1 %) of all participants are Non-EU but they make up only 
58.0 % of the group who behaved consistently in game A and in game B. The reason for this 
may be that the participants from the EU have more experience with rather artificial decision 
situations such as economic experiments. 
5 Results 
Participants in our study (who we will call “policy-makers”14 in the following) care about 
equity to a considerable amount. The mean value of  which measures aversion against 
disadvantageous inequity is 0.368. The corresponding value for the parameter that mirrors 
aversion against advantageous inequity is even higher: The mean value of  is 0.590 which 
is quite high if one takes into account that this parameter is restricted to the interval [0, 1). 
iα
iβ
Figure 1 compares these values to the corresponding findings in the study of Dannenberg et 
al. (2007) which was essentially identical to the Internet study but used solely students as 
experimental subjects. Obviously, students care much less about equity: Their mean  is very 
low at 0.090 and also  with a mean equal to 0.355 is much below the corresponding value 
of the respondents in the Internet experiment. The differences in  and  between both 
populations are highly significant which is confirmed by a two-sided Mann-Whitney-U-test.
iα
iβ
iα iβ
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14 This terminology is used just for simplicity. While the majority of our participants actually has been involved 
in negotiations some respondents answered they had been only observers to the climate talks. 
15 The p-values are both 0.000 for  and . The number of independent observations is N = 369 for students 
and N = 62 (N = 76) for participants in the Internet study in the case of  (
iα iβ
iα iβ ). A p-value below 0.05 indicates 
that there is a significant difference in median values between both subject pools. 
 16
Figure 1: Cumulated density and mean of alpha and beta (students vs. policy-makers) 
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The figure above also shows differences in the distributions of both parameters between the 
two subject pools, confirming again that participants in the current study are more equity 
concerned compared to the students. The differences in the distributions of  and  are 
highly significant which is tested by a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test for equality of 
distribution functions.
iα iβ
16
The joint distribution of  and  of the policy-makers is given in the scatter plot in 
Figure 2. As one can see, there is a different degree of heterogeneity in the distribution of both 
parameters. For , there are two peaks each with more than 20 % of the observations at the 
intervals (0.5, 0.6] and (0.7, 0.8] indicating that a majority of respondents cares much about 
advantageous inequity. Contrary to this, a vast majority of participants is not concerned at all 
with disadvantageous inequity: More than 60 % of all subjects show an  value of zero. 
Moreover, it turns out that there is no correlation between both inequity parameters: 
Spearman’s 
iα iβ
iβ
iα
ρ  for  and  is 0.164 with a p-value of 0.255. In addition, we find that only 9 
out of 50 subjects obey to the F&S-condition . 
iα iβ
ii βα ≥
                                                 
16 The p-value for  is 0.001 with N = 369 independent observations in the case of students and N = 62 
observations for policy-makers. The p-value for 
iα
iβ  is 0.000 with N = 369 (N = 76) independent observations for 
students (policy-makers). 
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Figure 2: Joint distribution of alpha and beta 
0 20 40 60
percent
0
(0;.1]
(.1;.2]
(.2;.3]
(.3;.4]
(.4;.5]
(.5;.6]
(.6;.7]
(.7;.8]
(.8;.9]
(.9;1.0)
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
be
ta
0 .5 1 1.5 2
alpha
0
20
40
60
pe
rc
en
t
0
(0
;.2
]
(.2
;.4
]
(.4
;.6
]
(.6
;.8
]
(.8
;1
.0
]
(1
.0
;1
.2
]
(1
.2
;1
.4
]
(1
.4
;1
.6
]
(1
.6
;1
.8
]
(1
.8
;2
.0
]
(2
.0
;2
.2
]
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Since there is much geographical variety of respondents in our study, we can check for 
differences in equity preferences between different regions of the world. The following 
Table 3 summarizes the results. 
Table 3: Regional differences for F&S parameters 
 alpha  beta 
 mean MWU test* KS test*  mean MWU test* KS test* 
EU vs. Non-EU        
     EU 0.326  0.542 
     Non-EU 0.395 0.282 0.637  0.615 0.196 0.583 
G8 vs. Non-G8        
     G8 0.301  0.501 
     Non-G8 0.392 0.103 0.206  0.620 0.116 0.422 
G77 vs. Non-G77        
     G77 0.454  0.640 
     Non-G77 0.302 0.079 0.160  0.556 0.073 0.079 
* p-value for the test of significance. 
 
While we cannot confirm significant differences in fairness parameters between EU-
respondents versus Non-EU-respondents and G8 versus Non-G8-participants, we find 
differences when comparing respondents from G77 to subjects that stem from Non-G77-
countries. G77-subjects have a mean  of 0.454 which is about 50 % above that of 
participants from Non-G77-countries (mean  of 0.302). Also for  there is a corresponding 
iα
iα iβ
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difference: G77-respondents show a  of 0.640 on average while the value for Non-G77-
subjects amounts to 0.556, i.e. the degree of aversion against advantageous inequity of G77-
participants is about 15 % stronger than of those from the Non-G77. Thus, respondents from 
G77-countries seem to be more avers against both advantageous inequity as well as 
disadvantageous inequity. However, both differences are only weakly significant. The two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov-tests analyzing the differences between the distribution 
functions of  and  for G77 versus Non-G77 also show either no significant difference 
( ) or only a weakly significant difference ( ). The differences between G77 and Non-G77 
participants with respect to both F&S parameters are illustrated in Figure 3. 
iβ
iα iβ
iα iβ
Figure 3: Cumulated density and mean of alpha and beta (G77 vs. Non-G77) 
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Next, let us turn to our respondents’ conjecture about the collective fairness preferences. 
Interestingly, most participants have stated how their individual fairness preference relates to 
the collective preference. Only about 16 % of subjects fall into the category “Do not know” as 
one possible answer to this question. The following Figure 4 contains frequencies of answers 
separated for subjects whose inequity parameter values lie above and below the mean value. 
Consider  first. On the one hand, nearly 64 % of those who are less averse against 
disadvantageous inequity, i.e. who have an  below the mean value, would also expect their 
country delegates to not act very fairness-oriented. 13.6 % expect them to act even more 
selfish, i.e. to claim a higher amount of money for Person 1. On the other hand, a clear 
iα
iα
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majority of those who care more about equity and show  values above the mean expect 
their country delegates to behave more selfishly: About 47 % of the respondents expect them 
to claim more money for Person 1 than for themselves. Only about 29 % think that their 
representatives would act much the same way they did. The distribution of answers for the 
two subpopulations “above mean” and “below mean” are significantly differently distributed 
which is confirmed by a two-sided Chi-square test.
iα
17 Taken together, we can summarize that 
only a small minority of respondents expects country delegates to act in a more fairness-
oriented way. A vast majority of both subpopulations assumes rather selfish decisions of the 
country delegates: Most “below mean” participants expect them to behave the same way, i.e. 
to have equally low  values, and the majority of the “above mean” participants expect them 
to have lower  values. 
iα
iα
Figure 4: Collective vs. individual preference for inequity aversion 
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Looking at  we find a slightly different and more ambiguous picture. Out of those who are 
less averse against advantageous inequity, only about a quarter expect the same degree of 
inequity aversion regarding the collective preference, while nearly 40 % expect governments 
to be more, and about 20 % to be less selfish. About 41 % of those showing values above the 
mean expect their delegates to behave the same way they did, but a percentage nearly as high 
expects representatives to act more selfishly. The answers for the two subpopulations are 
distributed differently.
iβ
18 Thus, again a majority of respondents does not expect governments 
to act in a more fairness-oriented way. However, unlike game A, the expectations of both 
                                                 
17 We conducted a two-sided Chi-square test on the individual level. The number of independent observations is 
17 and 44, respectively. The obtained p-value is 0.000. 
18 The p-value is 0.000 (two-sided Chi-square test). The number of independent observations is 37 and 36, 
respectively. 
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subgroups are different: The majority of the “above mean” participants think that the 
representatives are equally fair whereas the majority of the “below mean” participants expect 
them to be even more selfish than themselves. Furthermore, the answers of the “below mean” 
subpopulations in game A and game B are significantly differently distributed while answers 
for the “above mean” subpopulations are not.19
The conclusions from Figure 4 regarding the individual and collective preferences for 
inequity aversion are partly supported by the Probit estimates in Table 4. It becomes obvious 
that both F&S parameters elicited for each individual have significant explanatory power for 
the expected collective preferences, even if we control for other personal characteristics. The 
results are quite intuitive: A higher  leads to a lower probability to answer “Same way” but 
to a higher probability for “More for Person 1”. Thus, people with higher aversion against 
disadvantageous inequity do not expect their government to have the same degree of aversion 
but rather to be less avers against disadvantageous inequity. Regarding game B, a higher  
leads to a higher probability to answer “Same way” but to a lower probability for “Less for 
player 1”. Thus, people with higher aversion against advantageous inequity do not expect 
their government to be more inequity averse but rather to have the same degree of aversion 
against advantageous inequity. This result is also in line with Figure 4. However, the model fit 
for game B is worse than the one for game A. Hence, we should regard the interpretation of 
the corresponding data in game B with care. 
iα
iβ
The interpretation of results for game B is furthermore difficult due to possible confounding 
effects of preferences for “efficiency”.20 The fact that about 38 % of “above mean” subjects 
answer “More for Person 1” may be caused by the expectation that their government either is 
more selfishly orientated or has a stronger preference for efficiency. The same holds for the 
21 % of “below mean” subjects who indicate that their government will give “Less for Person 
1” as an answer. The reason for this may be either a higher degree of collective equity 
preference or a stronger preference for a higher total payoff. 
                                                 
19 The p-value is 0.000 (two-sided Chi-square test) for the “below mean” subpopulations. The p-value is 0.381 
(two-sided Chi-square test) for the “above mean” subpopulations. 
20 Remember, that the mean value of iβ  is equal to 0.59 which correspondents to the switching point #10 (see 
Table 1). 
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Table 4: Probit estimates 
Game A    alpha     age field engineer no COP participation  Ps. R2 
  Same way -0.514 * -0.066 *** -0.976 * 0.502   0.213 
  More for player 1 0.810 *** 0.043 ** 0.767 * -1.284 *  0.218 
      
Game B     beta   no COP participation  Ps. R2 
   Same way 1.210 *   0.808 **  0.101 
   Less for player 1 -1.669 ***   -0.648   0.121 
 
Remarks 
(1)  ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1/5/10% level. The number of observations is 61 (73) for game A (B). 
(2) The variables “field engineer” and “no COP participation” are dummies for the corresponding attribute of the subject.  
(3) For game A, due to lack of data no estimate for “Less for player 1” is possible. For game B, estimates for “More for
player 1” are not presented because of no significant results. Furthermore, variables “age” and “field engineer” are not
included due to no significant impact. 
(4) The probit estimates can be divided by 2.5 to make them comparable to the OLS slope estimates and to interpret them
as marginal effects on the probability to choose the corresponding category. See Wooldridge (2000), p. 537.  
6 Discussion 
From a policy-oriented point of view, the most interesting and also important question might 
be what the implications of our findings for real world climate negotiations are. The answer is 
not quite easy and one has to be very cautious: Real world climate policy is a complex matter 
dealing with many more influences than equity attitudes only. Moreover, as already 
mentioned we have to be aware that equity preferences as measured in our study are not 
identical to collective preferences of countries. Despite this fact, the individual preferences of 
policy-makers in our study may serve as a starting point for a discussion of the role of equity 
for cooperation of countries in climate policy. As a vast majority of participants in our study 
expects governments to not act in a more equity-oriented way, the individual preferences can 
be seen as an upper bound for inequity aversion reflected in collective preferences. 
The voluntary contribution game introduced in section 2 lacks many features of the real world 
climate problem, e.g. an explicit modeling of costs and benefits of climate policy and their 
regional distribution. However, it captures the essential incentive problem that the 
international community faces, namely the voluntary provision of the global public good 
“climate protection”. Thus, let us assume that this game can be seen as a rough approximation 
of the incentive problem underlying real world climate negotiations. What do our findings 
then imply within this modeling context? 
The critical condition for achieving cooperation is given as ( ) ( ) ( )jjj βαβank +1−+<1− . 
This condition (see section 2) implies a lower bound for the critical value of k, , the 
number of countries that will defect in any case. We obtain for the lower bound 
critk
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jjcrit βaβak −1>⇔0>1−+⇔0> . Obviously, an increasing degree of aversion against 
advantageous inequity makes it easier to meet this requirement. To state it the other way 
round: Low values of  imply that cooperation can only be obtained if a, i.e. the MPCR of 
climate mitigation policies, is sufficiently high. In our study, we find a mean value for  of 
0.590. Let us for convenience neglect the rather small regional differences and consider this 
mean value for  only. Our empirical finding then implies that cooperation could be 
obtained only if 
iβ
iβ
iβ
410> .a .  
Of course, currently nobody can tell whether the return of climate mitigation policies is above 
or below 0.4. However, what matters in real world policies is the perceived return. Some 
countries have been very skeptical about the merits of mitigation policies in the past. The 
United States for example heavily pointed to the implied costs while at the same time rising 
doubts whether there are any benefits of climate policy at all. This observation leads to the 
conclusion that the perceived MPCR for the US in the past might have been very low, 
offering some explanation why the US have been so hesitant to adopt an active climate 
mitigation policy.21 On the other side, the Europeans predominantly have been very optimistic 
about net benefits of climate policy, giving some explanation for their self-declared leadership 
in climate policy. Thus, although Europeans and Americans may bother about equity roughly 
to the same amount, this may not be sufficient to reach agreement in climate mitigation 
policy. What is needed in addition is a commonly shared view about sufficiently high net 
benefits of such policies. In other words, strong equity preferences are only necessary but not 
sufficient for a successful climate agreement. Besides equity preferences, sufficiently high net 
benefits of the contribution to climate protection are required in order to ensure a stable 
cooperative outcome. 
Moreover, condition (3) may offer part of an explanation as to why the US dropped out of the 
Kyoto Protocol. If we interpret a as the perceived MPCR of mitigation policies, one might 
speculate that for the Clinton-Gore administration, the return of active climate policy was 
high enough in order to assure that 01>−+ ja β , thus allowing for the possibility to take part 
                                                 
21 So even if Americans are concerned about equity issues, too, this does not automatically lead to the decision to 
contribute to the global public good “climate protection”. The simple voluntary contribution game shows that 
inequity aversion is not the sole determinant for the decision to cooperate, but high enough returns of 
cooperative behavior have to be guaranteed as well. Note that we have no reason to assume that (North) 
Americans are less concerned about equity issues than the average. The average value of iβ  for participants 
from the US and Canada is 0.52. Unfortunately, only five subjects from North America participated in our study, 
so we cannot claim representativeness. 
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in a climate treaty. Even if 01>−+ ja β  there still remains the problem of what an 
acceptable number of countries abstaining from their own substantial obligations would be. 
This issue has been discussed extensively in the US and the US Senate, for example, 
unanimously argued that important developing countries should not be allowed to stay outside 
the Kyoto Protocol.22 In any way, for the Bush administration, the perceived MPCR of 
climate policy has presumably been much lower, such that , making 
participation in a climate treaty no longer worthwhile.  
0<1−+ jβa
In the following, we turn to a discussion of some more specific results of our study. Although 
we find a difference regarding the degree of inequity aversion between participants from G77 
and Non-G77 countries, it has to be noted that it is only weakly significant. Moreover, 
considering alternative groupings of countries like G8 versus Non-G8 or EU versus Non-EU 
countries we are not able to detect any significant differences. Given the huge differences in 
socio-economic circumstances between different regions of the world, this is a remarkable 
result. On the one hand one could expect poorer countries to put a much higher weight on 
equity compared to the industrialized world. On the other hand it might be possible that 
people with a low income act in a more selfish way. Actually, we do not find clear evidence 
for either of them. Employing regressions in order to explain both F&S parameters by means 
of several independent variables, we could confirm only very few significant effects. In Table 
4, we depict the results for two models with various socio-economic and geographical 
characteristics (age, gender, field of education, status as negotiator, origin) and either the per-
capita CO2 emissions or the per-capita GDP of the participant’s home country. Interestingly, 
subjects with a degree in political science (  and ) and engineering science ( ) exhibit 
significantly lower F&S inequity aversion.
iα iβ iβ
23 Furthermore,  is negatively influenced by the 
per-capita GDP and the per-capita CO
iα
2 emissions. However, this effect is only weakly 
significant and the fit of the corresponding models is rather unsatisfying. Both models do not 
show any other significant effects.  
                                                 
22 This has been codified in the Byrd-Hagel resolution passed with unanimity before COP3 in 1997. The Byrd-
Hagel resolution makes own substantial reduction measures of important developing countries a prerequisite for 
the US to participate in the Kyoto Protocol. Although many have conjectured that this resolution was motivated 
purely strategically, our discussion shows that there might be some underlying economic rationale, since it could 
be the result of a positive but still too low perceived return of climate policy. 
23 However, we have no proper explanation for this result. Usually one would expect economists to show lower 
inequity aversion (see e.g. Dannenberg et al. 2007) but this is actually not what we observe. 
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Table 4: Regression results 
 alpha beta 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Gender female -0.189 
(0.238) 
-0.160 
(0.236) 
 0.078 
(0.073) 
0.083 
(0.073) 
Age -0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
 0.003 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
Field engineering science -0.117 
(0.202) 
-0.115 
(0.193) 
     -0.232*** 
(0.084) 
     -0.224*** 
(0.081) 
Field political science     -0.590** 
(0.266) 
  -0.527* 
(0.277) 
-0.196 
(0.098) 
   -0.213** 
(0.095) 
Field economics and  
    business administration 
-0.341 
(0.218) 
-0.268 
(0.212) 
-0.029 
(0.115) 
-0.036 
(0.113) 
Per-capita CO2 emissions   -0.040* 
(0.021) 
 -0.006 
(0.008) 
 
1000*Per-capita GDP    -0.019* 
(0.010) 
     1.9e-03 
   (5.0e-03) 
Negotiator at COP/SB level  0.020 
(0.217) 
 0.013 
(0.214) 
-0.061 
(0.065) 
-0.069 
(0.064) 
Origin Africa -0.349 
(0.421) 
-0.352 
(0.410) 
-0.117 
(0.119) 
-0.043 
(0.131) 
Origin Australia and Ozeania -0.288 
(0.240) 
  -0.419* 
(0.230) 
 0.029 
(0.119) 
-0.040 
(0.094) 
Origin Asia  0.114 
(0.288) 
 0.071 
(0.286) 
  0.134* 
(0.079) 
 0.190 
(0.119) 
Origin North America -0.007 
(0.250) 
-0.242 
(0.198) 
-0.118 
(0.123) 
-0.188 
(0.117) 
Origin South America -0.508 
(0.314) 
-0.497 
(0.302) 
 0.055 
(0.118) 
 0.130 
(0.133) 
constant      0.957** 
(0.440) 
    1.049** 
(0.467) 
      0.573*** 
(0.177) 
    0.496** 
(0.221) 
R-squared 0.140 0.152 0.235 0.233 
# of observations 60 60 74 74 
Note: Robust standard deviations in parentheses. ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1/5/10% level. 
 
With respect to  one has to bear in mind that our results could be driven by confounding 
effects of preferences for efficiency. As mentioned earlier, for  our design 
overestimates aversion against advantageous inequity while for 
iβ
530< .iβ
530> .iβ  it is underestimated. 
This is due to the fact of a non-constant size of the pie in the egalitarian decision cases. Now 
imagine it were possible to separate pure inequity aversion from efficiency. Then our result of 
rather similar values for  would not necessarily be due to similar equity attitudes. Rather, it 
could be that subjects with low pure inequity aversion hold strong preferences for efficiency 
and vice versa. For future research on the reasons for cooperative behavior in social dilemma 
situations, it would be highly interesting and desirable to decompose these two effects.
iβ
24
                                                 
24 Previous experimental evidence with respect to this question is mixed. While some papers identify situations 
where a preference for efficiency seems to have a dominant effect (see e.g. Engelmann and Strobel 2004, 
Andreoni and Miller 2002) others argue that efficiency concerns are dominated by fairness concerns, i.e. by 
inequity aversion (see e.g. Güth et al. 2003, Levati et al. 2007). For our purposes, further research on this 
question should focus on the specific strategic incentives of social dilemma situations. 
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To sum up, neither the non-parametric tests nor the regression models find significant 
differences between regions. We have to conclude therefore that inequity aversion on average 
is rather similar across regions – at least if one compares similar groups, namely people 
involved in international climate negotiations, from different countries. This finding is in line 
with the literature. Oosterbeek et al. (2004) carried out a meta-analysis of 37 ultimatum game 
experiments looking for differences in the subjects' behavior. They find that there are no 
significant differences in the behavior of responders in the ultimatum game that can be traced 
back to cultural differences or socio-economic differences.25
Our findings support the hypothesis that inequity aversion is a rather “hard-wired” disposition 
of human behavior that has developed during the human evolution. Thus, one should expect 
the distribution of such equity parameters to be rather similar when comparing different 
populations. However, we have to concede that our data basis is rather small. It might be that 
an investigation based on a broader data set comes to different conclusions. Moreover, it 
could be that per-capita GDP of the respective country is not a good proxy for the individual 
income of our respondents, which might be able to explain individual differences better, but is 
difficult to collect. We have to remember that all of our participants work in the field of 
climate policy so that they do not constitute representative groups of their home countries. 
The income of the participants from developing countries is presumably above the average of 
the country. Therefore, if the individual income was indeed an influencing factor of the 
degree of inequity aversion, the comparison between representative samples from developing 
versus industrialized countries would probably show greater differences. The answer to this 
question, however, remains to future research. 
For us, it remains to discuss and explain the highly significant difference in degrees of 
inequity aversion between students and policy-makers. Partly, this may be due to an education 
effect. Since the beginning of economic experiments, it has been repeatedly documented that 
economists are less cooperative in dilemma games and less fair in bargaining games. The two 
subpopulations in the current study and in Dannenberg et al. (2007) differ in this respect: 
While only about 8 % of our participants hold a degree in the field of economics and business 
administration, the corresponding percentage in our comparison study is higher than 60 %. 
Due to several problems such as the absence of overlapping characteristics (e.g. age, degree) 
                                                 
25 This implies that the  values of participants in the experiments analyzed in Oosterbeeck et al. do not 
significantly differ. Thus, strictly speaking we can only conclude that our result regarding  is in line with the 
literature. We are not aware of a similar meta-study analyzing dictator games or modified dictator games which 
would allow comparisons of . 
iα
iα
iβ
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within both populations, we have not been able to investigate this hypothesis statistically. It 
could also be that differences in the average income of students and policy-makers matter for 
the measured difference in experimental behavior. The average earning of students in the 
experiments of Dannenberg et al. (2007) were about €6 while participants in this study earned 
$8.63 on average, which is roughly the same amount. However, €6 is presumably a much 
higher share of a student's total monthly income than of the income of a diplomat or a 
scientist. Since the relative amount is thus higher for students, this may explain why they 
decided in a more selfish way. Another possible explanation is the experience with economic 
experiments. About 69 % of the students had participated in laboratory experiments before. 
Therefore, they were certainly more conversant with such decision situations which might 
lead to more selfish decisions.26
7. Conclusion 
In this paper we tried to shed some light on the question about how far equity considerations 
are important for climate negotiations. We operationalize the notion of equity introducing the 
concept of inequity aversion developed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). According to their 
approach, people are endowed with aversion against advantageous and disadvantageous 
inequity to a different degree. We measure the degree of inequity aversion of people who 
have been involved in international climate negotiations with the help of two simple games 
which resemble the decisions in a dictator and an ultimatum game. Our main finding is that 
policy-makers care about inequity to a considerable amount. Since the participants of our 
experiment do not expect their governments to be more inequity avers but rather to be equally 
avers or to be more selfish, we can take the measured individual inequity aversion as upper 
bound for the collective preferences. 
If one accepts the simple voluntary contribution game as a rough approximation of the 
essential incentive problem underlying real climate policy, two key variables turn out to be 
decisive for the success of international climate negotiations: First, parties have to be 
endowed with sufficiently strong equity preferences. Second, parties must expect sufficiently 
high net benefits from mitigation policies, i.e. technically speaking they have to expect a high 
enough marginal per capita return from their contribution to the public good. Our empirical 
estimates for the degree of inequity aversion raise doubts about whether the latter condition 
                                                 
26 This would be in line with Brosig et al. (2007) who observe a strong erosion of other-regarding preferences 
over a sequence of several dictator and prisoner’s dilemma games. 
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has been fulfilled in the past for all countries. Thus, differences in the perceived MPCR of 
climate policy may be part of an explanation why Europeans claimed leadership in climate 
policy and why the US abstained. 
We find that policy-makers exhibit a much stronger preference for equity than students. 
Possible explanations for this include an education effect, different relevancy of experimental 
payoffs, and different experience with economic experiments. Considering the geographic 
variety of respondents’ countries of origin in our sample, we cannot confirm significant 
differences in inequity aversion. Our findings are therefore in line with the literature which 
also cannot confirm such differences in this kind of games between different regions of the 
world due to cultural differences. These findings fit the idea that inequity aversion is an 
anthropological fundamental, not much influenced by socio-economic or cultural 
circumstances. We have to bear in mind, however, that our participants are not representative 
samples of their home countries but rather work all in the same field, namely the international 
climate policy. 
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Appendix 
This appendix includes the instructions and the decision problems for the internet experiment: 
Login 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Instructions 1 
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Instructions 2 
 
 
Instructions 3 
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Decision Problem A 
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Decision Problem B 
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Additional Questions 
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